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AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES
AFFECTING POSTSECONDARY ATHLETICS*
WILLIAM A. KAPLIN**
Athletics, as a subsystem of the postsecondary institution, is governed by the
basic principles applicable to higher education generally. These principles, however, must be applied in light of the particular characteristics and problems of
curricular, extracurricular, and intercollegiate athletics programs. A studentathlete's eligibility for financial aid, for instance, would be viewed under the
general principles governing financial aid, such as contract law and constitutional
due process, but aid conditions related to the student's eligibility for or performance in intercollegiate athletics may create a special focus for the problem. In
Taylor v. Wake Forest,' for instance, the court held that a student-athlete's refusal
to participate in practice was a breach of his contractual obligations under his
athletic scholarship. Similarly, procedural due process principles may apply when
a student-athlete is disciplined, and First Amendment principles may apply
when student-athletes engage in protest activities. But in each case the problem
may have a special focus.
ProceduralDue Process
In a discipline situation, the penalty may be suspension from the team, thus
raising the issue whether the same procedural protections accompanying suspension from school are applicable. For institutions engaging in state action, the
constitutional issue is whether the student-athlete has a "property interest" or
"liberty interest" in continued intercollegiate competition sufficient to make
suspension of that interest a deprivation of "liberty or property" within the
meaning of the due process clause. Of three recent lower court cases addressing the
question, two have answered affirmatively and one negatively.
In Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives2 , a suit
brought by University of Minnesota basketball players suspended from the team
for participating in an altercation during a game, the court reasoned that
participation in intercollegiate athletics has "the potential to bring [student
athletes] great economic rewards" and is thus as important as continuing in school.
The court therefore held the students' interest in intercollegiate participation to be
protected by procedural due process and granted the suspended athletes the
protection of notice and a hearing established in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
*This article is adapted from excerpts from W. A. Kaplin, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION: LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING (1978), copyright©1978, Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers,
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Education.3 In Regents of University of Minnesota v. NCAA, 4 the same U.S.
district court reaffirmed and further explained its analysis of student athletes' due
process rights. The court reasoned that the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate competition was a property interest entitled to due process protection not
only because of the possible remunerative careers that result but also because such
participation was an important part of the student athlete's educational experience. (Although the appellate court reversed this decision, 5 it did so on other
grounds and did not question the district court's due process analysis.)
In contrast, the court in Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 6 relying on an
appellate court opinion involving high school athletes7 , held that college athletes
had no property or liberty interests in either participating in intercollegiate sports,
participating in postseason competition, or appearing on television. The court did
suggest, however, that revocation of an athletic scholarship would infringe
property or liberty interests of the student and require due process safeguards. 8
The appellate court affirmed. 9 Given this disagreement among the courts, the
extent of student athletes' procedural due process protections remains an open
question.
First Amendment Rights
In a protest situation, the First Amendment rights of athletes must be viewed
in light of the institution's particular interest in maintaining order and discipline in
its athletic programs. An athletes' protest which disrupts an athletics program
would no more be protected by the First Amendment than any other student
protest which disrupts institutional functions. While the case law regarding
athletes' First Amendment rights is as sparse as that regarding their due process
rights, Williams v. Eaton 10 does specifically apply the leading student protest case,
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District," to a protest by intercollegiate football players. Black football players had been suspended from the team
for insisting on wearing black armbands during a game to protest the alleged racial
discrimination of the opposing church-related school. The court held that the
athletes' protest was unprotected by the First Amendment because it would
interfere with the religious freedom rights of the opposing players and their

3294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (expulsion of
students from state university because of civil rights
acti ity).
4422 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Minn. 1976).
5560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977).
6417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976).
Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976).
1417 F. Supp. at 895. Cf Corr v. Mattheis, 407 F.
Supp. 847
interest in
well as a
foreclosing
tunities.)

(D.R.I. 1976) (students have property
continued receipt of federal aid funds, as
liberty interest in freedom from stigmas
further educational or employment oppor-

9570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978).
10468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972).
''393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the Court held
that the First Amendment prohibited the suspension
of several high school students for wearing black
armbands to school to protest the United States'
Vietnam policy, as their conduct was a non-disruptive
exercise of free speech. The Court emphasized, however, that student conduct which, for any reason, "'materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others" is not entitled
to constitutional protection. See also Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169 (1972) (Tinker applied in higher education setting).
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church-related institution. The Williams opinion is unusual in that it mixes
considerations of free speech and freedom of religion. The court's analysis would
have little relevance to situations where religious freedom is not involved. Since the
court did not find that the athletes' protest was disruptive, it relied solely on the
seldom-used "interference with the rights of others" branch of the Tinker case.
Tort Law
Tort law is another area where athletics programs present special problems.
Because of the physical nature of athletics and because athletics programs often
require travel to other locations, the danger of injury to students and the
possibilities for institutional liability are greater than those resulting from other
institutional functions. These problems are subject to general tort liability principles, applied in light of the special characteristics of athletics programs. In Scott v.
State, 12 for instance, a student collided with a flag pole while chasing a fly ball
during an intercollegiate baseball game; the student was awarded $12,000 damages
because the school had negligently maintained the playing field in a dangerous
condition, and the student had not assumed the risk of such danger. But in
Rubtchinskv v. State University of New York at Albany, 13 a student injured in an
extracurricular pushball game did not collect damages; the student was injured
when clipped by another player, and the court held the student had assumed the
risk of such injury.
When the alleged negligence is that of a public institution (as in the two cases
above), the general principles of tort immunity may also apply to athletic injury
cases, In Lowe v. Texas Tech University, 14 for instance, a varsity football player
with a knee injury had his damages suit dismissed by the intermediate appellate
court because the university had sovereign immunity. But on further appeal the suit
was reinstituted because it fell within a specific statutory waiver of immunity. 15
Sex Discrimination
Sex discrimination has become a major issue in athletics programs. Before the
passage of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 16, the legal aspects of this
controversy centered on the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. In
recent years courts have held that certain governmental actions violate this clause
because they classify and treat persons differently on the basis of their sex. 17 Courts
have been searching for an appropriate standard by which to ascertain the validity of
sex-based classifications in athletics. Most of the cases have concerned female high
school athletes seeking the opportunity to try out for male teams. Although the
12158 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
3260 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Ct. Cl. 1965). See generally
the series of Annotations on tort liability in athletic
programs at 34 A.L.R. 3d 1210(1970); 35 A.L.R. 3d 725
(1970); 36 A.L.R. 3d 361 (1970).
14530 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App, 1975). See

provision of Title IX prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex in any education program receiving federal
funding.

generally Annot., modern status of Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity As Applied to Public Schools and
Institutions of Higher Learning," 33 A.L.R.3d 703
(1970).

17See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
Kirstein v.
University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va.
1970) (discrimination in admissions).

15540 S.W, 2d 297 (1976).
120 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq (1976).

rhe central
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decisions are not all in agreement, a consensus appears to be developing on one
point. When the sport is a "noncontact sport," that is, a sport involving little bodily
contact among participants, the female athlete must be afforded an equal
opportunity to compete for the traditionally male team if there is no comparable
athletic activity provided for females. 18
Since the implementation in 1975 of the Title IX regulations, '9 the equal
protection aspects of sex discrimination in high school and college athletics have
been playing second fiddle to Title IX. Since Title IX applies to both public and
private institutions receiving federal aid, it has a broader reach than equal
protection, which applies only to public institutions. Moreover, Title IX has several
provisions on athletics which establish requirements more extensive than anything
yet devised under the banner of equal protection. Thus in most situations the Title
IX regulations, rather than the equal protection clause, will provide the primary
legal guidance in dealing with sex discrimination in institutional athletic pro-

grams. 20
Section 86.41 of the Title IX regulations is the primary provision on athletics:
it establishes various equal opportunity requirements applicable to "interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics." Section 86.37(c) establishes equal
opportunity requirements regarding the availability of athletic scholarships.
Physical education classes are covered by section 86.34, and extracurricular
activities related to athletics, such as cheerleading and booster clubs, are covered
generally under section 86.31. Institutional activities falling within these various
categories are subject to Title IX whether or not they directly receive federal funds.2'
In 1975, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued a
memorandum 22 titled "Elimination of Sex Discrimination in Athletic Programs"
23
which provided initial help in understanding these various requirements.
Probably the greatest controversy stirred by Title IX concerns the issue of sexsegregated versus unitary (integrated) athletic teams. The regulations develop a

"8The cases are collected in Annot, "Validity,
Under Federal Law, of Sex Discrimination in Athletics," 23 A.L.R. Fed 664 (1975).
1945 C.F.R. Part 86 (1977).
20

In July, 1978, HEW Secretary Joseph Califano
announced he had established a special policy unit to
help HEW's Office for Civil Rights resolve complaints
of sex bias in school athletics programs. The Title IX
Policy Work Group was charged with responsibility
for drafting policy guidelines on specific issues involving bias in school sports, with particular emphasis on
postsecondary institutions.

2145 C.F.R. §§ 86.2(h), 86.11
2240 Fed. Reg. 52655 (1975). See also "Directive
on the Application of Title IX to Intercollegiate
Athletics," 43 Fed. Reg. 18772 (1978) (revenueproducing sports); and HEW's proposed enforcement
guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 58070 (1978).
23

Postsecondary institutions must have achieved
full compliance with sections 86.41, 86.37(c), and 86.34
by July 21, 1978. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.41(d), 86.37(c)(2),
86.34(a); HEW Memorandum, 40 Fed. Reg. 52655
(1975). With respect to § 86.31, full compliance was
required by July 21, 1976; 45 C.F.R. § 86.3(c).
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compromise approach to this issue which roughly parallels the equal protection
principles emerging from the court cases noted above. 24 Under section 86.41(b),
[an institution] may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of
each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or
the activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient
operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one sex
but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, and
athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously been
limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for the
team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes
of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey,
football, basketball, and other sports the purpose or major activity of
which involves bodily contact.
This regulation requires institutions to operate unitary teams only for noncontact
sports where selection is not competitive. Otherwise the institution may operate
either unitary or separate teams and may even operate a team for one sex without
having any team in that sport for the opposite sex, so long as the institution's overall
athletics program "effectively accommodate[s] the interests and abilities of members
of both sexes." 25 In a noncontact sport, however, if an institution operates only one
competitively selected team, it must be open to both sexes whenever the "athletic
26
opportunities" of the traditionally excluded sex "have previously been limited."
Institutions similarly retain wide discretion in devising administrative
structures for their athletic programs. An institution may have either "separate
administrative structures for men's and women's sports (if separate teams exist) or a
unitary structure," so long as the structure or coaching assignments do not "have a
disproportionately adverse effect on the employment opportunities of employees of
27
one sex."
Regardless of whether its teams are separate or unitary, the institution must
"provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes." 21 This requirement
"addresses the totality of the athletic program of the institution rather than each
sport offered." 29 While equality of opportunity does not require either equality of

24 It is still an open question whether Title IX's
athletic regulations fully comply with constitutional
equal protection and due process requirements. There
is some basis for arguing that the Title IX regulations
do not fully meet the equal protection requirements
that courts have constructed or will construct in this
area. See W. Kaplin and S. Marmur, "Validity of the
'Separate but Equal' Policy of the Title IX Regulations on Athletics," a memorandum printed in the
Congressional Record S777-779 (daily ed., Jan. 23,
1975). One court has ruled on the question, holding
Title IX regulation 86.41(b) unconstitutional as applied to exclude physically qualified girls from compet-

ing with boys in contact sports; Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. v. Ohio School Athletic
Assn., 443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
2545 C.F.R. § 86.41(c)(1); HEW Memorandum,
supra note 22, at 52656.
2645 C.F.R. § 86.41(b).
27HEW Memorandum, supra note 22, at 52655.
HEW has taken the same position with respect to the
institution's physical education department;
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, p. 10, col. 4 (Nov.
8, 1976)..
2h45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c).
29
HEW Memorandum, supra note 22, at 52656.
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"aggregate expenditures for members of each sex" or equality of "expenditures for
male and female teams," an institution's "failure to provide necessary funds to
teams for one sex" is a relevant factor in determining compliance. 30 Those grappling
with this slippery equal opportunity concept will be helped by section 86.41(c)'s list
of ten nonexclusive factors by which to measure overall equality:
1. Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
2. The provision of equipment and supplies;
3. Scheduling of games and practice time;
4. Travel and per diem allowance;
5. Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
6. Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
7. Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
8. Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
9. Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
10. Publicity.
The equal opportunity focus of the regulations also applies to athletic
scholarships. Institutions must "provide reasonable opportunities for such awards
for members of each sex in proportion to the number of each sex participating in
intercollegiate athletics." 3' If the institution operates separate teams for each sex,
as permitted in section 86.41, it may allocate athletic scholarships on the basis of
sex to implement its separate team philosophy, so long as the overall allocation
achieves equal opportunity. If athletic scholarships are not allocated by sex, the
institution must assure that its criteria for awarding such scholarships "do not
32
inherently disadvantage members of either sex."
Discriminationon the Basis of Handicap
Under HEW's regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,33 handicapped students must be given an opportunity to participate in
physical education and athletics programs:
(1) In providing physical education courses and athletics and
similar programs and activities to any of its students, a recipient to
which this subpart applies may not discriminate on the basis of
handicap. A recipient that offers physical education courses or that
operates or sponsors intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics shall
provide to qualified handicapped students an equal opportunity for
participation in these activities.

C. F. R. § 86.41(c).
3145 C.F.R. §§ 86.37(c)(l).
32HEW Memorandum, supra note 22, at 52656.
3329 U.S.C. § 794, as amended by Section 11 (a)
3045

of the Rehabilitation Amendments of 1974. The implementing regulations are published in45 C.F.R. Part 84
(1977).
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(2) A recipient may offer to handicapped students physical
education and athletic activities that are separate or different only if
separation or differentiation is consistent with the requirements. . . (that
the programs and activities be operated in "the most integrated setting
appropriate") and only if no qualified handicapped student is denied the
opportunity to compete for teams or to participate in courses that are not
34
separate or different.
Given the newness of these requirements, the difficulty of the concepts and
problems they deal with, and the lack of interpretive court decisions, much is yet to
be learned about this area of the law. Some concrete content, specifically in the
athletic context, must be given to the critical concepts of "qualified handicapped
student," "equal opportunity," and "most integrated setting appropriate."
Legal Principles Regarding Athletic Associations and Conferences
Often legal issues regarding athletics will arise from the activity of the various
athletics conferences and associations which participate in regulating intercollegiate athletics. Individual institutions have become involved in such legal issues in
two ways. Student athletes penalized for violating conference or association rules
have sued both the conference or association and the institution over the
enforcement of these rules. And institutions themselves have sued conferences or
associations over their rules, policies, or decisions. Either situation presents the
difficult threshold problem of determining what legal principles apply to the
dispute.
The bulk of such disputes have involved the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), the primary regulator of intercollegiate athletics in the
United States. In a series of recent cases courts have held that the NCAA, an
institutional membership association for both public and private collegiate
institutions, is engaged in "state action" 35 and thus subject to the constraints of the
U. S. Constitution such as due process and equal protection. The leading case,
Parish v. NCAA, 36 concerned sanctions applied against Centenary College for
granting athletic eligibility to several basketball players who did not meet the
NCAA academic requirement. The players, later joined by the college, challenged
the constitutionality of the academic requirement (then known as the "1.600 rule").
The court rejected the NCAA's argument that it is a private association not subject
to the Consititution:
We see no reason to enumerate again the contacts and the degree
of participation of the various states, through their colleges and
universities, with the NCAA. Suffice it to say that state-supported
educational institutions and their members and officers play a substan-

1145 C.F.R. § 84.47(a).
Generally, courts have used three different
approaches in analyzing whether an ostensibly private
entity is engaged in state action. See, e.g., Powe '.
Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2nd Cir. 1968) (delegated power
35

theory); Greenva . George Washington Univ., 512
F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (public function theory):
Rackin '. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (government contracts theory).
36506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tial, although admittedly not pervasive, role in the NCAA's program.
State participation in or support of nominally private activity is a wellrecognized basis for a finding of state action.... Moreover, we cannot
ignore the states'-as well as the federal government's-traditional
interest in all aspects of this country's educational system. Organized
athletics play a large role in higher education, and improved means of
transportation have made it possible for any college, no matter what its
location, to compete athletically with other colleges throughout the
country. Hence, meaningful regulation of this aspect of education is
now beyond the effective reach of any one state. In a real sense, then, the
NCAA by taking upon itself the role of coordinator and overseer of
college athletics-in the interest both of the individual student and of
the institution he attends-is performing a traditional governmental

function. 31
The court here is using first the "government contacts" theory and second the
"public function" theory of state action. (Most other cases holding the NCAA
engaged in state action, such as Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 38 rely only on the
government contacts theory.) Having found the NCAA to be engaged in state
action, the court proceeded to examine the NCAA's rule under due process and
equal protection principles, finding the rule valid in both respects.
Besides the Constitution, relevant legal principles can be found in the common
law of "voluntary, private associations." 39 Primarily these principles would require
the NCAA and other conferences and associations to adhere to their own rules and
procedures, fairly and in good faith, in their relations with their member
institutions. Trustees of the State Colleges and Universities v. NCAA, 4 0° for instance,
arose after the NCAA had declared a California state university's athletic teams
indefinitely ineligible for postseason play. The university argued that the NCAA's
decision was contrary to the NCAA's own constitution and bylaws. The lower court
issued a permanent injunction against the NCAA. The court of appeals affirmed,
reasoning that the relationship between the NCAA, as a voluntary association, and
the university, as a member, was one of contract, evidenced by the constitution and
bylaws of the NCAA. To enforce this relationship, courts will intervene in a private
association's internal affairs to nullify substantial disciplinary action taken against a
member in violation of the association's constitution and bylaws.
Thus, two legal avenues exist which a postsecondary institution may use in
disputes with the NCAA: the United States Constitution and the common law.
These approaches are two-edged, however: student-athletes may also claim these
constitutional and common law protections when the NCAA and the institution
are jointly engaged in enforcing NCAA rules against them. In these circumstances
37 Id. at 1032-33.
38510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
39
Regarding the application of voluntary private
association law to the NCAA, see Note, "Judicial
Review of Disputes Between Athletes and the National

Collegiate Athletic Association," 24 STANFORD L. RLE.
903, 909-916 (1972).
4082 Cal. App. 3d 461, 147 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1978);
see also California State University, Hayward v.
.\CA A, 47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1975).
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even private institutions may be so involved with the NCAA's state action that
they are themselves engaged in state action. Institutions may also be acting on the
NCAA's behalf sufficiently to be subject to the common law principles binding that
association. The same legal principles would be relevant to other athletic associations and conferences in which postsecondary institutions hold membership,
although the existence of state action will depend on whether the particular
association meets the requirements of Parish and other similar cases.
Conclusion
As this survey indicates, postsecondary athletics programs are subject to a
wide range of legal principles. For the most part, legal problems which arise in
other areas of a postsecondary institution's activities will have legal counterparts in
postsecondary athletics. Many of the principles and problems mentioned here, as
well as other special issues of postsecondary athletics, are treated in greater depth
in the articles in this symposium.

